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1 Focusing not  on the virtues  but  on the vices  of  communication;  examining,  through
associated pathologies –  and social pathologies especially – not the ways and means of
communication,  but  the  deviations  that  may  stem  in  part  from  communication;
considering communication not as a way of preventing or reducing of these pathologies
but as a possible vector of a circular process of aggravation: these, briefly, are the outlines
of this issue of Questions de communication .  Quite a task: a few articles on the subject
would hardly have sufficed to cover, or even map out, a topic that could range, if we go by
received ideas, from addiction to the electronic world and the syndromes of derealisation
and  isolation  triggered  by  virtual  technologies,  to  propaganda  systems  and  other
techniques for air-brushing political or social conflicts. But it is also a task that may seem
rather incongruous given the mantras surrounding our conceptions of communication
and the doxa that has established communication not only as an active ingredient of
social life generally, but also as a vital resource whose value is indisputable. 
2 The “social pathology” idea is obviously a nod in the direction of the Frankfurt School,
where it is linked in particular to the revival of critical theory inspired by the philosopher
Axel  Honneth,  who  succeeded  Jürgen  Habermas  at  the  helm of  the  Social  Research
Institute. It is well known that, in the general definition offered by Honneth in La Société
du mépris, the idea covers the full range – varying as it does with different social cultures
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and conditions – of “social relations or changes that, for everyone, affect the conditions
of  self-realisation”  (Honneth,  2006:  179).  The  reality  of  inequality  and  injustice,  the
hardships of social conditions and positions, the pressures of performance and mobility,
for example, are not only, from this point of view, difficult situations in which social
subjects may find themselves but which remain outside their mental and bodily sphere,
but actual pathogenic agents liable to invade their intimacy and infect their inner self,
where  they  can  trigger  particular  disorders  and  place  those  affected  –  to  different
degrees,  although  it  is  unlikely  that  anyone  is  entirely  unaffected  –  in  a  neurotic
relationship with themselves as well as with the collective spheres to which they belong.
Referring to the social pathologies of communication, where communication itself is taken as
the  source  of  particular  pathologies,  therefore  creates  a  double  paradox,  which  the
authors of the contributions that follow, from different sectors of our “inter-discipline”,
have willingly taken on board. The paradox on the one hand is central to the very notion
of “social pathologies”, in the sense that these refer to disorders and afflictions for which
communication – identified here in accordance with Jürgen Habermas, who sees it as the
normative core of society, an active resource for shared understanding and rationality –
is  usually  seen  as  a  means  of  prevention  or  cure.  But  the  paradox  also  concerns
communication  itself  or,  to  be  more  specific, what  society  agrees  to  refer  to  as
“communication” - a rather loose term for which, in the pages that follow, the inverted
commas used here should be kept in mind.
3 It has become a commonplace to observe that the word “communication” covers a wide
variety of fields and levels of analysis,  of phenomena and points of view, of fields of
investigation and theoretical corpuses, of concepts and methods. Less commonplace is to
say that it  also covers a tangled web of descriptive observations – for example,  “one
cannot not communicate”,  as Paul Watzlawick maintained – as well  as a prescriptive
dimension: we have to communicate, you have to keep informed, everyone has to be in
tune with their times and interact in harmony with others, etc. Communication, then, is
at once an object (or a complex of highly varied objects) and discourse on that object (or
on  objects  that  sometimes  substitute  for  each  other  according  to  need);  at  once  an
inhabited world (as a matrix of society) and a means of confinement in that world; at once
a discipline that operates at the point of intersection between different sectors of the
humanities, the applied sciences and one sector of market production (or an auxiliary
sector  for  others  in  this  type  of  production);  at  once  a  value,  subtly  enforced  but
obligatory nonetheless, and the work involved in imposing consensus on that value; at
once a set of practices that can be problematised for scientific study and a series of strictly
ideological issues. In the latter, it is striking to observe that communication, boiled down
to a purely iconic term and an addictive reflex, tends to be used as both a panacea and an
alibi in mainstream political and media discourse, as when leader writers and decision-
makers start interpreting – and naming – social conflicts,  resistance to “change” and
“reforms” or the “failure” of the EU referendum, in terms of a “communication deficit”
(or  “learning deficit”)  between  “partners”  who  have  unequal  information  about  the
constraints  and  opportunities  of  an  “increasingly  complex  world”  (on  these  various
clichés,  see  Durand,  2007).  The  author  of  an  anthology  of  the  information  and
communication sciences was quite right to say – perhaps too incidentally – that “the
invasive phraseology [of communication] is the opium of our time” (Bougnoux, 1993: 10).
Indeed it is, a tediously anaesthetising phraseology used to discuss the psychosocial and
political  virtues  of  communication  –  through  expressions  like  “establishing
relationships”, “connections”, “intercomprehension”, “reliance”, and so on and so forth -
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in a discourse whose circularity is fully equal to the soporific properties of any opiate.
“Problems  necessarily  appear  as  soon  as  communication  is  seen  as  the  solution  to
everything”, as Yves Winkin remarked when introducing a polemical essay that took on
not only the degraded variants of  the theoretical  models used in the communication
sciences  proper  –  variants  as  exemplary  as  NLP  or  the  methods  for  reading  facial
expressions popularised by a certain Paul Ekman – but also the danger for those same
sciences,  in an increasingly heteronomous academic world,  of  being pressed into the
service  of  commercial,  entrepreneurial  or  political  demands;  “although”,  he  adds,
“solutions  can  come  within  reach  as  soon  as  communication  is  seen  as  a  problem”
(Winkin, 2003: 15).
4 Taking an unambiguously critical view of communication – its theoretical difficulties, its
definitions  and  intuitive  representations,  or  the  eschatology  and  highly  affirmative
theology in which it surrounds itself in times when “ideologies” are supposedly in retreat
and the main symbolic “thirds” on the verge of collapse – is obviously not new, as shown
by the efforts of Lucien Sfez to dismantle scholarly constructions and their utopian pillars
in  his  imposing  Critique de  la  communication  (1988)  and  his  Dictionnaire  critique  de  la
communication (1993), which he pursues in Technique et idéologie (2002). It should also be
borne in mind that this kind of criticism does not always enjoy the company of such
eminent  thinkers,  and  that,  for  example,  the  weighty  metaphor  with  its  obsessively
repeated themes of “suggestion”, “contagion” and “contamination” was the means used
by the ideologue-cum-psychologist Gustave Le Bon (1895), in the latter half of the 19th
century, to promote his ideas on how the propagation of the affect and of the emotions
produces “the popular mind”, a state in which a crowd becomes an organism in itself
where physical  proximity invariably  whips  up sentiment  to  the point  of  obliterating
individual free will. From this reactionary view of communication as a means of fuelling
mass hysteria developed, perhaps for the first time, the idea of a social pathology at work
not only in mass movements but also in the democracy of universal suffrage. Nor should
we forget the symbolic gratification and the philosophical kudos derived from taking a
stance on an object  of  common interest  that manifestly challenges common wisdom.
Adorno  and  Horkheimer,  in  Dialectic  of  Enlightenment  (1944)  on  the  entertainment
industry, or, more recently, Paul Virilio in his Politics of the Very Worst [Cybermonde. La
Politique  du pire  (1996)]  on the changes in tempo and acceleration of  techno-political
developments, thus held views diametrically opposed to the reassuring, clichéd norm,
showing how the emancipating power of reason will tend, in a technologically governed
society,  to turn into its  exact  opposite – alienation,  mystification,  conditioned minds
reverting to the magic of the never-ending cycle that makes time stand still – and how
the  universal  interconnection  of  information  networks  presaging  the  planetary
breakdown  of  information  has  virtually  doomed  democracy  to  extinction  through
excessive control over our minds and the sheer speed of data traffic. An overshadowing,
elitist and therefore minority view, which is fundamentally questionable and irritating no
doubt, but less exasperating and certainly less likely to affect social practice and political
choices than the semi-scholarly mantras, slogans and clichés that redundantly permeate
today’s omnipresent discourse on “the information society”, the “virtual economy” or the
“knowledge society”. 
5 In the first  volume of his Memoirs,  describing the mythical  America that had already
pervaded the clearest minds, Talleyrand (Jean de Bonnot 1967: 71) maintained that “the
spirit of destruction” rushes in whenever communication becomes easier. At about the
Social Pathologies of Communication
Questions de communication, 15 | 2009
3
same time, around 1830, Chateaubriand (1848, t. II: 662) – greatly exercised as well as
prophetic  about  Germany’s  modernisation,  which  he  believed  could  only  serve  the
purposes of war1 [French quote in end-of-page note] – wrote with savage irony about the
rapturous admiration of modern ways he saw among his contemporaries2 [ditto] (ibid. :
527).  He  himself  would  not  be  dazzled  by  “steamships  and  railroads”,  the  selling  of
manufactured goods and the wealth amassed by a few French, English, German or Italian
soldiers in the service of Turkish masters, for that “is not spreading civilisation”3 [ditto] 
(1848, t. I. : 877). Thus speaks the aging cynic, doddering on the brink of a world no longer
his own, in the banal language of reactionary sentiment and petulant romanticism that
clearly stems from his rejection, like Talleyrand’s, of a modernity where the technical and
the political have become inseparable. These postures that we feel belong to a different
age at least have the merit of reminding us, should the idea come to mind, of what the
communicational  ideology  of  our  own time tends  to  make  us  forget  or  ignore:  that
communication,  whether  in  the  plural  or  the  singular  –  which  dilutes  it  into  the
anthropological approach or simply into a social phenomenon – is, is also, a technique
that serves the interests of the powers that be: in its physical forms from Roman roads to
the  motorways  of  modern  Germany,  from  semaphore  to  the  word  wide  web,
communication  is  inseparable  from  every  system  of  intervention,  surveillance  and
control,  from military systems serving the power of the State to economic and trade
networks  and  today’s  equally  market-based  circulation  of  virtual  information  and
entertainment.  These  successive  metamorphoses of  modernity,  up to  our  times,  into
manifestations of the natural order or serendipitous innovation, can be usefully placed in
a historical perspective: as in any form of modernity, its characteristics are the amnesia
surrounding its origins and the illusion it conveys of responding to a compulsion driven
purely by the power and inevitability of its own emergence. There is little doubt, for
example, that Chateaubriand, in his vituperations on the “model society”, was, in barely
disguised terms, attacking the “industrialist” doctrine of the Saint-Simon school, based
on a theory of communication networks, that took root from 1830 to 1840 in progressive
circles until its conversion in support of the technocratic State during the second French
empire,  through  the  good  offices  of  Michel  Chevalier,  the  first  Chair  of  political
economics at the Collège de France who in 1851 joined the imperial cause as advisor to
Napoleon  III  on  these  matters.  It  is  worth  remembering  that  the  development  of
transport systems and communication technologies went hand in hand, throughout the
19th century whose legacy is still  very much with us today, with the mystique of its
association with the universal peace that networks could bring (see Musso, 1997; 2003). It
is  also  worth  pointing  out  that  the  paradoxical  counterpoint  to  this  mystique,  its
reflection in the negative in both politics and mindsets, was the gradual establishment of
conditions  that  would  make  a  fragmented,  partitioned,  modular??  society  possible  -
against a backdrop of dissolution, virtually at least, of class groups and class solidarity –
based on the fiction of a social fabric woven from abstract, universal, interchangeable and
cumulative parts, a fiction whose principle - the secret ballot, a technique serving secrecy
and isolation at once – was realised, symbolically and in practice, on the eve of the first
World War (see Garrigou, 1998). The adoption of opinion polls, among other American
imports,  would  confirm,  in  Sartre’s  view,  that  the  systemic  nature  of  “technological
civilisation” implies in itself that individuals are interchangeable, juxtaposed units that
have to be merged into an organic whole. As he wrote in 1983:
“This is where we are heading with the mass media, the best seller, the book of the
month, the best record, Gallup, Oscar, etc. The idea is to present a single exemplar
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with an image of the whole. Of course this only produces an image of the majority,
but the majority is given as the expression of the whole […] Opinion remains outside,
it is the ideal and transcendent point where all conscience meets, but because it is
transcendent, it leaves each conscience entirely alone with itself, without the words
or concepts to express itself”.4 (Sartre, 1983 : 93)5
6 Utopian dreams of universal togetherness waved into being by the political magic wand
of networks and communications thus converged towards the idea of a society tending
wholly or partly towards anomie – a concept forged by Jean-Marie Guyau in his Esquisse
d’une morale sans obligation, ni sanction (1885) to define a morality that could suit a time
when the foundations of authority were collapsing (religion, the State, science), and in
which Émile Durkheim (1897: 264-311), in his study of suicide [Le suicide], would see a type
of pathology triggered by crisis and, more generally, by the state of a society where those
of its members who are cut off from one another by an excessive division of labour are
condemned  to  perpetual  mobility  and  uncertainty,  with  the  loss  of  their  sense  of
interdependence.
7 The point of this convoluted back-tracking through history, with its meanderings into the
genealogical byways of mutually reinforcing links between technology and technological
myth  and  between  the  development  of  communication(s)  and  the  process  of  social
serialisation, is not merely to dispel the euphoria of ideas and representations ordinarily
associated with communication and thereby to create a space for different perspectives
on the pathological conditions that communication(s), contrary to general belief, might
cause. The idea is also to establish the retrospective horizon that the article by David
Forest, in this issue, helps to define. The “collective  intelligence” he dissects is one of the
new clichés that have found their way into Utopian conceptions of communication: yet
another example of those secular prophecies flavoured as much by mystic fervour as by
cold utilitarianism, accompanied by the familiar discourse on “new technologies”,  on
which he has already published a robust analysis (Le Prophétisme communicationnel, 2004).
It  is  well  known  that  the  expression,  soon  to  be  incorporated  into  the  journalistic
technolect and whose emergence coincided in France with day-to-day internet use, was
coined by Pierre Lévy, the promoter of an “anthropology of cyberspace” and of a view of
humanity where the monadic individuals of a grid-mapped society would give way to free
nomadic  circulation  within  a  “global  brain”:  will  the  “information  highways”  and
“multimedia” widen the gap between rich and poor, between the in-crowd and the rest?
This is, he admitted, one possibility for the future. But if we understand their importance
in time, the new means of communication could also bring about a profound change in
the social fabric towards more fraternity, and even help to resolve the problems besetting
humanity today (Lévy,  1994 :  9).  This  is  a  familiar theme:  the great leap forward for
mankind thanks to globally interconnected networks and computers is a recycled version
of  MacLuhan’s  thinking,  itself  informed  by  the  telescoping  of  science  and  religion
characteristic of Teilhard de Chardin and, as we have seen, of Saint-Simon’s tenets on the
common physiology of material and spiritual webs. David Forest’s thinking, though, is not
so much genealogical as an attempt to track the idea of “collective intelligence” through
a maze of political, economic and legal discourses where the keynote, from Michael Hardt
and  Toni  Negri  to  Yann  Moulier-Boutang,  is  intoned  to  the  score  of  “cognitive
capitalism”,  and which combine the idea of  “new anthropological  realities”  with the
promotion of a “society based on contracts”, an apology of deregulation and suspicion of
any limitations imposed by intellectual property rules on the circulation of works in an
economy built on abundance and mobility. In which we see that the idea of “collective
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intelligence”  and  its  avatars  –  concepts  whose  plasticity  and  ubiquity  reconciles
anarchists  and  communists,  liberals  and  libertarians,  and  supporters  of  open-source
software  –  appear  not  only  as  advertising  propaganda for  electronics  industries  and
virtual worlds, but also closely match the neo-liberal creed as it spread through different
channels, in the 1980s and 90s, along with its lexicon that would have such far-reaching
consequences for political structures and mental health: mobility,  assessment,  creativity, 
innovation, fluidity, responsibility, flexibility and so on, all denoting ways of being in society
or representations of  society where communication,  as  conditioned by the electronic
paradigm, is clearly geared to the performative. Is there a pathology of communication?
Yes, according to David Forest, if the idea is understood not as the obverse of “healthy”
communication but rather as a permanent interplay between the visibility and invisibility
of a symptom affecting a social fabric that has been deeply penetrated by the ideologies of
communication. Ideologies that, like all others, are built into a political and economic
vision of the world that endows it with powerful means for imposing their dictates, but
also of  constructing social  reality  –  with the now familiar  trail  of  damage that  Axel
Honneth (2006: 181) had in mind when, in his interview with Olivier Voirol in 2001, he
advocated an analysis of society geared to a diagnosis of social pathologies aided by the
concept of recognition, which would, as he explained, make it possible to show that neo-
liberal capitalism is moving in a direction that would significantly damage the conditions
we  all  need  for  self-realisation  –  for  example  through  the  general  trend  towards
commodification, the undermining of personal relationships and the increasing demands
of “identity management”.
8 In the case of “collective intelligence” and its ramifications, the pathology in question,
however powerful, is still in a sense external to the act of communication: its conception,
its  political  spawning  ground,  its  suitability  to  a  particular  technical  and  economic
context and its ideological profitability stem more from its semantic charge than from
any  pragmatic  necessity.  This  is  the  focus  of  the  contributions  from  Christine  and
Véronique Servais,  who specialise respectively in the aesthetics of the media and the
anthropology  of  communication,  which  is  why  they  feature,  significantly,  at  the
beginning of this issue. Common representations of communication link its “success” to
the efficient transmission of a message, so that the effects produced that conform to the
intentions of the “sender” and ensure mutual understanding between sender and the
recipient, who are assumed not only to understand the same code but also to belong to
the same world of representation. It is this received idea, which has given rise to so many
of the usual models of communication as well as to the excessive privilege give to the idea
of “consensus”, which is questioned by Christine and Véronique Servais, in the light of
communication systems between humans and animals (as observed in this case in certain
“enchanted encounters” between people and dolphins in the wild) and with the aid of the
concepts of “dispute”, “disagreement” and, to a lesser extent, “difference “, borrowed in
turn from Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques Rancière and Jacques Derrida, and which all, in
various  ways,  encompass  the  question  of  otherness  and  the  acknowledgement  of
otherness in the act, and in the situation, of communication. The authors argue, through
a  discussion  of  accounts  of  these  encounters  and  close  cross-analysis  of  these
philosophical concepts with the work of the linguist Antoine Culioli, the anthropologist
Franco La Cecla and the contributions of Gregory Bateson and the Palo Alto school, that
considering  communication  in  terms  of  efficient  transmission  and  shared  worlds  is
tantamount  to  saying  that  intentional  manipulation  is  a  legitimate  ideal  in
communication,  and  obliterates  the  fact  that  misunderstanding could  actually,  and
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paradoxically, be its fundamental structure insofar as it is the condition under which
otherness emerges and is  maintained during the interaction.  The authors argue that
ignoring this structure has psychopathological consequences – through control by the
partner and negation of their otherness –or their politics – because a dominant idiom is
imposed: the desire to eliminate misunderstanding, to resolve it by referring to a rule, is
always the point where domination appears,  and continues as long as the dominated
partner is unable to make a point in the language of the dominant partner and to speak
from a position which is not their own, in which case the interaction turns into political
conflict in the strict sense. They plead in favour of communication as a concept founded
on real plurality; not in terms of shared worlds, which brings in the notion of hegemony
in representations  and language,  but  rather  in  terms of  dividing lines  between,  and
within, the interacting partners, a kind of distance and difference between selves that is
essential even for a relationship with the other to be possible.
9 Is  censorship a pathological  distortion of  the communication process under political,
moral,  economic  or  religious  constraint,  or  is  it  an  essential  component  of
communication? The question may seem surprising for two reasons. Censorship, first, is
supposed to have disappeared, at least in its preventive form, in our democratic regimes
dedicated to transparency and the free circulation of ideas; secondly, it seems obvious
that relationships between censorship and communication can only stem from purely
external  factors -  authoritarian repression,  or at  least  control,  on the one hand,  and
constant efforts towards free expression on the other. As a historian of the press, Laurent
Martin first dismisses the idea that, if we are to believe the narrative of emancipation
that goes hand in hand with the history of liberal societies, censorship has retreated from
our public sphere. Rather, it has shifted, gradually and in stages, as if following the media
system’s transformations to reach broader potential audiences, from the printed book
(16th to 18th century),  to theatre and the periodical press (19th and 20th centuries),
audiovisual media (20th century) and finally to the internet. And while censorship has
largely shifted downstream to sanction abuses of the freedom of expression, its earlier
form is still active within the film review board that was established in 1919 in France, a
country  where,  according  to  Pierrat  (Pierrat,  2008:  19),  the law  was  so  strict  that
specialised lawyers would say that if a “message” could be broadcast in France, it could be
broadcast  virtually  anywhere  else  in  the  world  with  impunity.  Finally,  blunted  and
softened but always possible, censorship is still just as effective in the various forms of
self-censorship  and self-regulation.  Taking a  different  slant,  to  discuss  censorship  as
integral to the process of communication itself is to bring in all of the work, inspired by
Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault or Pierre Bourdieu, on the processes of filtering ideas
that  are  imposed  by  the  order  of  language  and  discourse  but  also  by  patterns  of
compromise,  the  social  process  of  verbal  euphemisation,  the formats  and the norms
imposed on expression by the particular structures and expectations of  each field in
which,  and  for  which,  it  is  formulated:  this  “structural”  or  “invisible”  censorship
promotes orthodox opinion and, ultimately and paradoxically, produces a shift from the
idea of censorship as pathological to the idea that it is a normal form of communication
whose role is to interiorise the constraints it has to obey in order to be accepted, received
and understood, if not originally conceived. But there is a considerable risk, assuming
that censorship is ubiquitous and always already at work, of establishing it as such a
diffuse and permanent force that it becomes impossible to identify, of suppressing the
various  forms  it  can  adopt  and  of  disarming  criticism  by  making  it  pre-emptively
inoperative.  To  Laurent  Martin,  it  may  be  preferable,  for  purposes  of  scientific  and
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political  analysis,  to restrict  the term of censorship to properly attested examples of
authoritarian intervention in communication between a sender and a recipient and, in
order to treat the pathology, to encourage the use of therapeutic vigilance on the part of
the players concerned, as far as and including the enactment of rules to prevent abuses of
censorship.
10 Élise Vandeninden, a researcher in cultural mediation, sheds light on yet other forms of
pathology on the basis of a survey on art therapy. As she uncovers tensions between its
different conceptions, she also brings out a form of investment shared by the various
practitioners: creation is a “tool” for mediation, within a care centre or with the world
beyond it.  Carefully  keeping away from the normative,  her  “grammatical”  approach,
following Luc Boltanski (2004), is based on a corpus of work on art therapy and used to
map out salient patterns of activity that involve relationships between the sender, the
mediator and the different recipients, whether individuals or groups. She also shows that
each process of this type has a corresponding, assumed, therapeutic value. These are the
patterns  on  which  Élise  Vandeninden  focuses  her  survey  among  a  sample  of  art
therapists, using an entirely pragmatic sociological approach that brings out the testing
power of experience in context. The particular value of her results lies in showing the
hiatus between the patterns used as a model and their implementation, and sometimes
doubts among these practitioners as to the reality of their therapeutic value, with some
even claiming “purely aesthetic aims”. These discrepancies are interpreted in the light of
the trajectory and position of each agent in the artistic and medical fields, with the latter
predominating. Her analyses produce the convincing hypothesis that the patient is placed
by the art therapist in a paradoxical situation in which medical “art therapy”, practised
for purposes of mediation, is actually liable to result in a pathology of communication in
which patients find themselves in what Gregory Bateson, followed by Paul Watzlawick,
Janet Helmick Beavin and Don D. Jackson (1967: 195-196), called a “double bind”. As for
mediation centred on a more artistic, but marginal, dimension, this tends to introduce a
different language within the institution and to modify the role of the patient, so that the
use of art “for art’s sake” in psychiatry could mean the adoption of an “interactionist”
critique of mental illness - an approach in which “an attack on a hierarchy begins with an
attack on its definitions, labels and conventional representations of the identity of people
and  things”  (Becker,  1963:  229)  –  implying  that  considering  art  therapy  from  the
communication angle will inevitably bring its foundations into question.
11 We come to our – necessarily open-ended – conclusion with Thomas Heller’s article on
recognition and governance in the workplace, which brings social pathologies back into a
context and a perspective with which they are naturally associated, in other words the
psycho-social afflictions besetting the supreme exemplar of control and anthropological
domestication that the company workplace has become today. Building on the founding
studies of Axel Honneth, the author brings out some of the processes that, in this context,
produce “forms of domination linked to the quest for identity and self-realisation”. From
the observation that, in the world of employment, the recognition – or assertion – of the
qualities of an individual or group is claimed whenever it is lacking, he shows that such
recognition can also serve as an alibi for management and human resources practices to
motivate the workforce. Using examples borrowed from Christophe Dejours in Souffrance
en France.  La banalisation de l’injustice sociale  (1998) as a basis for his analysis,  Thomas
Heller explores how communication operates to disregard or deny recognition.  In so
doing, he makes a distinction between disregard and denial, in that the former is not an
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isolated practice but the foundation of an entire system, of a management strategy, while
the latter appears in particular through obstacles to practices encouraging recognition.
In  either  case,  the  author  shows,  as  does  Christophe  Dejours,  that  the  type  of
communication that presses employees, or their departments, to display themselves at
their best can be used – in the name of economics – to deny the reality of their work: a
distortion that, in the author’s view, comes very close to contempt. Hence his hypothesis
that communication, as a corporate practice for developing and disseminating messages,
in  effect  creates  obstacles  to  recognition  and  may  be  considered  as  a  practice  that
produces forms of  social  pathology.  From this,  he draws the idea that recognition is
associated  with  a  form  of  managerial  practice  that  instils  a  sense  of  self-worth  in
employees  by  encouraging  self-satisfaction,  in  order  to  produce,  temporarily  or
permanently, an effect of submission and/or performance.
12 In the words of Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1944: 22), “only thought which
does violence to itself is hard enough to shatter myth”. We cannot claim or even hope, in
this  issue,  to  have  provided  an  exhaustive  review,  delving  below  the  usual  bland
consensus  on  the  subject,  of  the  (more  or  less)  symbolic  forms  of  violence  that
communication can produce – not so much through its content, here, as in its structure
and  its  efficiency  as  a  social  process  or  myth-embellished  resource.  But  we  believe
nevertheless that together, the diversity of topics addressed in the following pages, the
varied tempo of  reflection,  from elliptical  to  emphatic,  the  range of  disciplines  that
provide  historical,  sociological,  anthropological,  legal  and  philosophical  perspectives,
have brought fertile ground for reflection on the very raison d’être of our publication,
Questions de communication.
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NOTES
1. «  …vomitoires à l’usage de nouveaux Barbares qui, sortant du nord avec l’immense train des armes à
feu, viendront inonder des régions favorisées de l’intelligence et du soleil »
2. «… niais[er] béatement avec des canaux, des chemins de fer, des tripotages d’art, des arrangements de
lettres ; monde de machines, de bavardage et de suffisance nommée société modèle »
3. « Je ne me laisse pas éblouir par des bateaux à vapeur et des chemins de fer ; par la vente des produits
des manufactures et par la fortune de quelques soldats français, anglais,  allemands, italiens enrôlés au
service d’un pacha : tout cela n’est pas de la civilisation »
4. « C’est à quoi tendent les mass media, best seller, book of the month, best record, Gallup, Oscar, etc. Il
s’agit de présenter à l’exemplaire isolé l’image de la totalité. Naturellement on n’obtiendra que la majorité.
Mais la majorité est donnée comme l’expression de la totalité. […] L’opinion demeure dehors, elle est le point
idéal  et  transcendant  de  jonction  de  toutes  les  consciences,  mais  précisément  parce  qu’elle  est  un
transcendant, elle isole chaque conscience en face d’elle-même, sans lui laisser de mots ni de concepts pour
s’exprimer »
5. Guy Debord, the author of La Société du spectacle summed this up forcefully in the idea that
while isolation is the necessary condition of technology, technology in return brings isolation [
L’isolement fonde la technique, et le processus technique isole en retour] (Debord, 1967: 21), suggesting,
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in this context and denying the myth surrounding communication technologies, that there is a
recursive loop between these technologies, which are supposed to bring people together, and the
isolation of social subjects.
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